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FOREWORD 
The study summarized in this report was a part of an analysis to 
determine the feasibility, desirability, and preferred approaches for disposal 
of selected high-level nuclear wastes in sp~ce. The Battelle Columbus 
Laboratories (BeL) study was an integral part of the Office of Nuclear Waste 
Isolation (ONWI)-managed DOE/NASA program for study of nuclear waste disposal 
in space, and was conducted in parallel with efforts at Battelle Pacific 
Northwest Laboratory; Boeing Aerospace Company; and Science Applications, Inc. 
(SAl - under subcontract to Battelle and reported here). The research effort 
reported here was performed by Battelle Columbus Laboratories (with SAl being 
a subcontractor) under NASA Contract NAS8-34512 from June 1981 through 
FebI'uary 1982. The study objective was to provide NASA and DOE with pre-
liminary space disposal risk estimates and estimates of risk uncertainty, such 
that potential total system risk benefits of space disposal of certain waste 
components could be evaluated. 
The information developed during the studY period is contained in 
this two-volume final report. The title of each volume is listed below. 
Volume I Executive Summary 
Volume II Technical Report 
Inquiries regarding this study should be addressed to: 
C. C. (Pete) Priest, COR 
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center 
Attention: PSOI 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
Telephone: (205) 453-0413 
i 
Eric E. Rice, Project Manager 
Battelle Columbus Laboratories 
505 King Avenue 
Columbus. Ohio 43201 
Telephone: (614) 424-5103 
BATTE:LLE - COLUMDUS 
~; , 
... 
, . 
· :~ 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The principal authors, Eric,E. Rice, Richard S. Denning, and Alan L. 
Friedlander (SAl), acknowledge the assistance of the following individuals who 
provided contributions to the technical content of this report: 
James B. Baeker (Wiggins Co.) 
Warren E. Berry 
Anthony A. Boiarski 
Walter K. Boyd 
Michael S. Bridgman 
Richard S. Burian 
Frank Cibelli (NASA/KSC) 
David C. Cox 
Arthur J. Coyle (ONWl) 
Thomas C. Davis 
Richard W. Earhart 
James M. Hudson (Wiggins Co.) 
Lewis E. Hulbert 
Kenneth D. Kok 
Donald J. Kessler (NASA/JSC) 
Robert E. Kurth 
Fred L. Leverenz 
Sean J. McKenna 
Lisa A. Miller 
A. George Mourad 
William S. Pope 
Fred G. Rea 
Richard P. Reinert (Boeing) 
Robert C. Reynolds 
Sam G. Sampath 
Dwight L. Suiter (NASA/JSC) 
Chen-sayh Tsay 
G. Walker (Univ. of Hawaii) 
Albert E. Weller 
William C. Wells (SAl) 
Kenneth R. Yates 
Recognition is given to Robert F. McCallum and his study team at 
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) for their input to this study. 
Their study results formed the basis for the possible riak benefit of space 
disposal, complementing the mined geologic repository. 
Acknowledgment is also 'mad'e 'to the outstanding guidance and coopera-
tion by the NASA/MSFC study monitor, Claude C. (Pete) Priest. Also, special 
thanks must go to Ralph E. Best, Program Manager at the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (ONWI) , Columbus, Ohio, and 
Philip R. Compton, Energy Systems Division, Office of Aeronautics and Space 
Technology, NASA/Headquarters, Washington, DC, for their thoughtful guidance 
throughout the study. 
11 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
.(-
; i . 
·1 ' fl ' 
;t 
1, 
:' ( 
,: .,), 
.:-
:. ~. 
,) 
'1 
; ~f 
'1 
'1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
FOREWORD. • • • • . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1.0 INTRODUCTION • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2.0 STUDY OBJECTIVES • 
3.0 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA AND DOE EFFORTS 
4.0 PRINCIPAL STUDY ASSUMPTIONS AND GUIDELINES • 
5.0 TECHNICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS • 
5.1 System Safety Design Guidelines for Reference Concept • 
5.2 Space Disposal Concept Definition in Summary. • • •••••• 
5.2.1 Waste Source and Mix. • • • • • • • • • ••••••• 
5.2.2 Waste Form •••••••••••••••••••••• 
5.2.3 Payload Fabrication • • • • • • • • • • ••••• 
5.2.4 Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles •• 
5.2.5 Launch Site Facilities and Operations •••••••• 
5.2.6 Uprated Shuttle Vehicle • • • • • • • • • • • • 
5.2.7 Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV) ••••• 
5.2.8 Orbit Transfer Vehicle and Solar Orbit 
Insertion Stage • • • • • • • • • 
5.2.9 Orbital Operations. • • •• 
5.2.10 Space Destination • • •••••••••••••• 
5.3 Overall Risk Model Approach • • • • ••••••••• 
5.4 Space Disposal Risk Estimates • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
5.4.1 Space Accident Identification •••••••••• 
5.4.2 Mission Phase and Fault Tree Development ••••• 
5.4.3 Payload Response Analysis •••••••••••••• 
5.4.4 Preliminary "Space" Risk Estimates. • • • •• 
5.5 Integrated Risk Benefit!Disbenefit for Disposal Sy;tem 
Complemented by Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste • • • • • • • 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS ••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7.0 RECOMUENDATIONS. • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . · . 
APPENDIX A: REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS • · . . 
iii 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
1 
11 
1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
11 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
14 
17 
17 
19 
29 
29 
A-I 
B-1 
~'" 
"'"I" 
"" 
""" 
, ' 
,j 
""'~ 
"'"1 
;. J 
Table 1. 
Table 2. 
Table 3. 
Figure 1. 
Figure 2. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 4. 
Figure 5. 
Figure 6. 
Figure 7. 
Figure 8. 
Figure 9. 
Figure 10. 
i Figure 11. 
~ . 
Figure 12. 
,~. 
LIST OF TABLES 
Possible Insults to the Space Disposal Payload. • • 
Mission Phase and Timeline Definition 
Summary of Space Accident Consequence 
Estimates for Reference Concept • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Relationship of Study to Other Space Disposal Activities •• 
Ground and Space Operations for Reference 
Space Disposal Mission. • • • • • • • • • • • 
Waste Payload Package for Space Disposal. • • • 
Approach for Estimating Space Disposal Risk 
Phase 1 Fault Tree: Ignition to Impact 
Poi~t Clears Coastline ••••••••• 
Expected Cumulative Space Risk 
. . . . . . . . . . 
Comparison for HLW Disposal in Space. • • • • • • • • • • • 
Expected Cumulative Space Risk Comparison for 
1-129 and Tc-99 Disposal in Space • • • • • • • • • • • 
Integrated Expected Cumulative Release Risk Comparisons (in 
Curie Sum of 15 EPA Isotopes) for HLW Disposal in Space 
Integrated Expected Cumulative Release Risk 
Comparisons (in Curie Sum of Eight EPA 
Actinides) for HLW Disposal in Space. • • • • • • • • • 
Integrated Expected Cumulative Release Risk Comparisons 
(in Curies of Tc-99) for HLW Disposal in Space. • • • • 
Integrated Expected Cumulative Release Risk Comparisons 
(in Curies of 1-129) for 1-129 Disposal in Space •••• 
Integrated Expected Cumulative Release Risk Comparisons 
(in Curies of Tc-99) for Tc-99 Disposal in Space •••• 
iv 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
15 
17 
18 
3 
9 
10 
13 
16 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
. .. :.{" " 
'" 
~. F 
~i 
•. 1 , } , 
~ ,~ 
'~1. " 
'\'\,\ 
.1, 
1 
t. , 
,'~ j} 
"; " 
;"1,( 
'-
; .... 
:; -~ 
~' ;: 
';'. 
':~ 
'r 
~; : 
,~. 
1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This volume (Volume I) provides a brief summary of the work performed 
during the 1981-1982 Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL) preliminary study of 
the risk of nuclear waste disposal in space. This volume summarizes the 
following: study objectives f appro.ach, assumptions, and limitations; the 
relationship of this effort to ot'herNASA and DOE efforts; the basic technical 
data and results derived from the study (contained in detail in Volume II); 
conclusions; and recommendations. References for this volume are listed in 
Appendix A. Abbreviations and acronyms used in this volume are defined in 
Appendix B. 
BATTI!LLE - COLUMDUS 
" 
.;-.." 
This Page Intentionally left Blank 
j-
i 
r 
OmGtr~ PAGE: IS 
3 OF. PO-Oa QUALIT.\! 
3.0 RELA'IIotISHIP TO OTHER llASA AIID DOE EFFORTS 
This study. performed by Battelle Columbus Laboratories with SAl 
subcontract support (for long-term risk estimates). was sponsored and 
monitored by UASA/MSFC. and funded through an interagency agreement with 
OlnJI/DOE. The 1981-1982 program effort is summarized in Figure 1. 
DEPAIlnlElIT OF EIftRCY WASTE HIXES FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
OFFICE OF N\ICLtAll WASTE 
ISOLATION (CNWI) BATTELLE PACIFIC NORTHWEST LAI 
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• PROCRAIt COORDIIIATlOM _e Cll£HICAL PAIlTlTlONINC FUSI8ILITY I\ANAGEHlNT #.liD PllllDIIG • REC<I1I'IENP AND ClIARACTEIlIZE WASU HIXES AND FORMS 
• REVlEW snlDT USULTS • liCIt II SK ASSESSIlEIIT FOR TERRESTllIAL Cc.lPON[NT 
• FUTURE PLIt.IIIIIIfG , t 
RISK ASSES5IIE1IT 1981 SroDY RESULTS 
BATTELLE COLUmUS LA8S • NEED FOI SPACE 
COLUH8US, OHIO DISPOSAL DOE/NASA 
• PP.ACTIOlf OF N\ICL!AR 
~,,- m_'~ - s: ASSESSKE~7 or EXISTING WASTE FOR SPACE _. RECa1l<ENDATION FOR RISK IIODELS DISPOSAL n'.AT COULD CO~711"UED SroDT RISK IIODEL APPROACH ornR OVERALL BENEFIT SPACE ADKINISTllATIO'lI • SAFETY REQU IRElll:IITS TO NlfTS PROGRAII 
IWlSIlALL SPACE nIGHT CEJITlR • DE\'l:LOP JU:FERENCE CONCEPT 
HUNTSVILLE, ALAI/.IIA • SPACE RISK ESTIllATES 
• TOTAL SYSTEII RiSK 
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-
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• REFERENCE CONCEPT , ~ 
• RISK ASS~SS>!£NT SPACE SYSTEIIS ANALYSIS 
BOEING AEROSPACE CO, 
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'-- . DtTEIlHI NATIOH OF WASTE 
IIIX/FOkH PAI'.AllETUS 
• CHARACTERIZE ALTERNATE 
• PAYLOADS 
• DEVELOP CM'DIDATE SPACE 
• SYSTEMS FOR EACH CATEGORY OF WASTE MIX/FORM 
FIGURE 1. RELATIOnSHIP OF STUDY TO 0TlIER SPACE DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES 
The Department of Energy. Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (ONWI). 
Columbus, Ohio, sponsored and managed the overall progrrun. ON'.n contracted 
with: (1) Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform the "Waste 
Mixes Study" (see McCallum et al, 1982), and (2) NASA to perform the "Risk 
Assessment and Space Systems Analysis Studies". Battelle Cohcbus 
Laboratories, Columbus, Ohio, uith support from Science Applications, Inc., 
Schaumburg, IllinOiS, was assigned the "Risk Assessment", and Boeing Aerospace 
Company, Seattle, Washington, was assigned the "Space Systems Analysis" (see 
Reinert et ai, 1982). 
The following discussion provides a brief overview of the work 
performed during the 1981-1982 studies by the various contributors. 
BATTELLE - CDLUMDUG 
.' 
.•. 
.. ~ 
t-
4 
The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) study defined promising waste 
mixes for space disposal along with their appropriate waste forms. PNL char-
acterized the physical properties of the waste mixes and forms, as well as 
side waste streams that are generated by processing the waste. PNL also 
characterized the short-term public health risks (in man-rems) of waste 
processing and the payload fabrication plant. Also, PNL assessed the isotopic 
release risk into the biosphere as a result of mined geologic repository (MGR) 
accidents involving natural processes (earthquakes) and human intrcsion 
(drilling). The risks from natural events, such as an earthquake, are assumed 
to occur after mined geologic repository (MGR) closure and are defined as 
long-term risks. The information from the PNL study was input to the space 
systems contractor (Boeing Aerospace Company). 
The Boeing study (Reinert et al, 1982) defined all the space systems 
required to support the waste mixes and waste forms defined by PNL. The 
systems were defined in accordance with safety requirements defined in this 
study (Battelle Columbus). Boeing assisted PNL in defining waste fabrication 
procerses and procedures. 
The Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL) study effort drew upon both 
the PNL and Boeing studies for input data. The BCL effort included the 
evaluation of both long- and short-term risk of the space disposal mission, 
starting with the receipt of the payload package at the launch pad. BCL has 
integrated the PNL results with BCL results to form preliminary estimates of 
total system risks for disposing of certain waste mixes. 
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4.0 PRINCIPAL STUDY ASS~~TIONS AND GUIDELINES 
The principal assumptions and guidelines that govern the results of 
this study are given below: 
• For the purpose of defining the «astt:! mixes available for dis-
. posal, 'only high-level waste (HLW) from commercial processing of 
light water reactor fuels was considered. 
• The Reference mined geologic repository is assumed ~o be in bedded 
salt and represented by the geology present at Paradox Basin. 
Terrestrial disposal data to be provided by Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory. 
• The overall risk comparison was made by normalizing to a 100,000 
metric tons of heavy metal (Ml1Ui) repository size. 
• A reprocessing rate of about 4500 MTHM per year by the year 2000 
was used for the Reference case. 
• Only one space disposal mission scenario and one payload design 
was considered for the major part of the risk analysis. Risks for 
disposing of alternate payloads to be estimated based upon the 
risks developed for the Reference mission concept. 
• BCL's preliminary estimates of space disposal risk include: (1) 
activity phases that begin with the receipt of the payload at the 
launch pad and end with final delivery at the space destination;'. 
(2) consideration of events that could occur after delivery to the 
final destination; and (3) the assumption of wastes decaying with 
time. 
• The preliminary BCL risk estimates are to be in terms of isotopic 
cumulative release to the biosphere, for the purpose of 
"compatible" integration of risk data. 
• Risks to occupational workers are not included in the study. 
• Only single-point failures for space transportation booster sys-
tems (Space Shuttle) are included in failure rates. Data to be 
provided by the Wiggins study (Baeker, 1981 and Hudson, 1979). 
• Data on the overall space systems to be provided by the Boeing 
study (Reinert et al, 1982). 
• Preliminary space disposal risk estimates to be provicled within 
funding limitations for the sturly. 
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5.0 TECHNICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
This section summarizes the findings of the study that are contained 
in total in Volume II of the final report. Section 5.0 is organized into the 
following subsections: 
5.1 General System Safety Design Guidelines for Reference Concept 
5.2 Space Disposal Concept Definition in Summary 
5.3 Overall Risk Model Approach 
5.4 Space Disposal Risk Estimates 
5.5 Integrated Risk Benefit/Disbenefit for Waste Management 
Systems Complemented by Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste. 
5.1 System Safety Design Guidelines for Referenr.e Concept 
One of the most important factors in the ultimate decision-making 
process for the space disposal concept is public health safety. For space 
disposal to be an acceptable approach. it is likely that the total long-term 
health risk of a space disposal concept coupled with terrestrial disposal must 
be at a comparable or preferably at a much lower level than that of terres-
trial disposal of all the waste. The short-term health risk must be at an 
acceptable level. 
Over the years of studying space disposal. a "safety concept" has 
been developing. Work done on safety specifications for radioisotope thermal 
generators (U.S. DOE. 1977) was included in the development of safety guide-
lines for space disposal. As a result of the current study. the safety 
guidelines were modified·to guide Boeing's study. 
The system safety guidelines for the nuclear waste disposal in space 
missions help to assure that nuclear waste payloads and their associ&ted 
handling may be considered acceptable and radiologically safe. 
The gen~ral system safety guidelines are based upon the assumption 
that the waste payload is carried into space by the uprated. liquid rocket 
boosted Space Shuttle vehicle and is processed at the launch site in a 
facility named the Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility (NPPF). 
The general safety objectives for the nuclear waste disposal in space 
mission are: (1) to contain the solid radiollctive waste materials. and (2) to 
limit the exposure of humans and the environment to the radioactive waste 
materials. For normal operations. complete containment and minimum radiologi-
cal exposure are required. For potential accident situations. the degrees of 
containment and interaction shall result in an acceptable risk to humans and 
the environment and be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Many of the 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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general safety guidelines have been selected using our best judgment and do 
not have the benefit of detailed analysis. 
The general system safety guidelines for the nuclear waste disposal 
in space mi~sion involve the following safety aspects: 
(I) Radiation Exposure and Shielding 
(2) Containment 
(3) Accident Environments 
(4) Criticality 
(5) Postaccident Recovery 
(6) Monitoring Systems 
(7) Is:>lation. 
The details of th~ general safety guidelines are given in Section 2.0 
of '-,llume II of this report. 
5.2 Space Disposal Concept Definition in Summary 
The current Reference Concept has evolved i>ased upon the study 
results of PNL (McCallum et aI, 1982) and Boeing (Reinert et aI, 1~82) and 
developed further by BCL. The ground and space operations are shown in Figure 
2. Aspects of the overall disposal mission are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Uaste Source and Mix 
The primary waste source would be high-level nuclear waste generated 
by the operation of commercial nuclear power plants and recovered by reproces-
sing. The waste mix to be disposed of in space is reprocessed high-level 
waste (containing 0.5 percent of the p~utonium and 0.1 per=ent of the uranium 
that is preFent in the fuel rods at the time of reprocessing) that has been 
out of the reactor for approximately 50 years. Also, at the time of 
reproc~ssing, 95 percent of the strontium and cesium is removed. Gases and 
trnnsuranic (TRU) wastes, plus 95 percent of strontium and cesium, would go to 
disposal in the mined geologic repository. Plutonium would be processed out 
of the TRU wastes; this fraction would be added to the mix and go into space 
for disposal. The combination of cesium and strontium removal and the 50-year 
aging of the waste is needed to avoid postburial meltdown for the "Reference-
sized" sphere packages flown on a given mission. (Smaller spheres or dilution 
of the waste form would allow the transport of IO-year-old waste.) 
5.2.2 W~ste Form 
The Reference waste form for space disposal is the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (ORNL) iron/nickel-based cermet (ceramic/metal matrix), a 
dispersion of ceramic particles in a continuous metallic phase. This waste 
form has been cho~en over others because of its expected responses to possible 
accident environments. The cermet is expected to have a wsste loaning of the 
order of 67.4 percent, where 100 percent is defined as high-level waste in 
BATTI:LLE - COLUMBUS 
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oxide form. The thermal conductivity is expected to be about 9.5 W/~·C. and 
the density is about 6.5 g/cc. 
5.2.3 Payload Fabrication 
TIle cermet waste form would be made into cylir:rlricOll bi./ ;.c"':R ,;,:uoxi-
mately 6 CtlI in diameter. They would be placed into E. "1.1t .. t· .. 'ulesti 3teel 
s1,'herical waste form support I3tructure or core. The; C(\!'{' n,,., l" ~ r-arallE'l 
holes bored in it to accommodate the stacked cylindrlccl h.'.! ,'to.; ~ '.'ee }o'lgure 
3). At the 'payl(lad' fabricat10n facility the billets would 'De installed in i:he 
core using an automati~ loading machine. Covers at bot:n ends of each bore 
would be installed to retain the billets. The loaded core would then be 
lowered into the lower half of th~ container/integral shield. The upper half 
of the integral shield would then be lowered into place and the uppel' and 
lower shield halves ~lectron-beam welded together. Almost all of the 
graphite/steel "tiles" would be pre1.nstalled on the shield halves. A "aelt" 
around the equator would be left free of tiles to allow the elec.tron-beam 
weld. Following the weld. the remaining tiles ~ould be installed using remote 
handling equipment. T1:e waste payload is th.an ready to be placed in a 
shipping cask for transport to the launch &ite. 
5.2.4 Shipping Casks and Ground Transport Vehicles 
For transport from the waste processing and fabrication facilities, 
the waste package would be housed in a shipping cask. The cask would be 
licensed by .:he U.S. Nuclear Re.gulatory Commission (NRC) and would be 
transported by rail to the launch site. 
5.2.5 Launch Site Facilities and Operations 
Upon arrival at the launch site. the waste package would be removed 
from the cask and placed into its flight support structure system and stored 
for launch •. 
5.2.6 Uprated Shuttle Vehicle 
The Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle is defined as having oxygen/RP-l 
Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs) replacing the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRUs). 
This not only provides for a 45,400-kg payload, but allows increased safety 
for the launch ascent phase and a lower launch cost. 
5.2.7 Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV) 
The Shuttle Derived Vehicle (SDV) would be derived from the basic 
Uprated Space Shuttle, where the Orbiter is replaced by the Space Shuttle Main 
Engine (SSME) propulsion pod and a large aerodynamic payload shroud (sec 
Figure 2). This vehicle would be llsed to launch Orbit Transfer Vehicle~ 
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FIGURE 2. GROUND AND SPACE OPEP~TIONS FOR 
REFERENCE SPACE DISPOSAL MISSION 
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(OTVs) and the Solar Orbit Insertion Stage (SOlS) into low-Earth orbit. The 
vehicle would also use Liquid Rocket Boosters. 
5.2.8 Orbit Transfer Vehicle and Solar Orbit Insertion Stage 
The OTV would be a large hydrogen/oxygen cryogenic stage, employing 
current technology. The SOlS would be a cryogenic propellant vehicle with 
long-life subsystems. 
5.2.9 Orbital Operations 
The SDV would be launched first to place the OTV/SOlS on orbit (38 
degrees, 370 km). Two waste packages would then be launched by the Uprated 
Space Shuttle to rendezvous with the OTV/SOlS. The OTV/SOlS would then dock 
with the payload in the cargo bay of the shuttle Orbiter. The payload package 
would be removed, and the OTV /SOIS would carry out the proper caneuvers to 
deliver the payload package to its destination. The OTV would be recoverable. 
The expendable SOlS would provide the velocity increment at perihelion (0.85 
A.U.) needed to circularize the solar orbit. 
5.2.10 Space Destination 
The space destination for the Reference Concept is the orbital region 
between the orbits of Earth and Venus. The nominal circular orbit is defined 
as 0.85 ± 0.01 A.U., with a I-degree inclination from the ecliptic plane. 
5.3 Overall Risk Model Approach 
The overall risk model approach that has been developed for the 
current study is to estimate the nonrecoverable, cumulative, expected radio-
nuclide release in curies to the Earth's biosphere for different options of 
the disposal of nuclear waste. 
The risk estimates for the disposal of the waste in a wined geologic 
repository (MGR) are based upon analyses of accident sequences performed by 
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory (McCallum et aI, 1982). The space risk 
estimates were developed by Battelle Columbus Laboratories. 
Although it would have been preferable to represent the consequences 
of accidental releases in terms of direct health effects to the human popula-
tion, funding limitations did not permit this level of analysis. Instead, the 
consequences of accidents are characterized in terms of the release of radio-
nuclides in curies to the biosphere (air, ground, and sea). In those cases 
where release might occur from the waste package, but for which cleanup 
operations would be anticipated (in the near term), credit was taken for the 
recovery of material. 
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Four sets of radionuclide groups have been selected to illustrate the 
results: (1) the sum of 15 important long-lived radionuclides (as given in 
the draft EPA release limit guidelines - see U.S. EPA, 1981), (2) the sum of 
importa:lt actinide elements (AC), (3) Tc-99 , and (4) 1-129. The time span 
considered in the study is one million years. Not only could events occur at 
various times in the future, the release of radioactive material to the 
biosphere could be distributed over extended time periods following an 
accident. In the presentation of the results, the expected release rate of 
radionuclides is integrated over time to obtain the cumulative expected 
release in curies, and this integral is plotted versus time. Short- and 
long-term risks are provided in the same figures. 
For comparative purposes, the risks from (1) the Reference MGR, (2) 
the MGR complemented for each space disposal option without space disposal 
accidents, and (3) accidents directly associated with space disposal are each 
displayed separately. By adding thp. space disposal risk to the complemented 
MGR risk and comparing the reference case, the potential benefits/disbenefits 
of the space waste disposal options could be determined. 
5.4 Space Disposal Risk Estimates 
This section briefly describes the approach used to estimate the rate 
of space disposal. Details are provided in Volume II. The basic approach to 
determining ~eliminnry estimates of space disposal release risk, as defined 
in Section 5.3, was developed by considering what would be the most cost-
effective method (because of limited funding for this effort). Basically the" 
approach used drew on: (1) past data bases developed for space disposal 
(Pardue et aI, 1977; Edgecombe et aI, 1978; and Rice et aI, 1980a); (2) Space 
Transportation System (STS) failure rates developed by the Wiggins Company 
(Baeker, 1981; Hudson, 1979); (3) previous works by A. Friedlander on long-
term risk (see Rice et aI, 19803); (4) expert opinion where easily obtainable; 
(5) new response analYSiS, where practical; (6) engineering estimates; and (7) 
technical data provided by Boeing (Reinert et aI, 1982). The desired format 
for "space risk" was determined by the format developed by McCallum et al 
(1982) for geologic disposal, both the Reference case and the various "comple-
mented" cases. The major goal was to develop "space risk" in terms of 
probabilistic cumulative releases (unrecoverable) to the biosphere from launch 
through to one million years. It was assumed that short-term risks could be 
mitigated by accident recovery and rescue, although these would not always be 
either successful or complete. For longer time frames (beyond 100 years after 
launch), recovery and rescue were not included in the analysis. Figure 4 
provides an overview of the approach used for estimating space disposal risks. 
5.4.1 Space Accident Identification 
Accidents that involve the nuclear waste payload were the only ones 
considered. Previous analyses (Edgecombe et aI, 1978) presented a list of 
possible accidents for a space disposal mission. Since that work and other" 
follow-on work (Rice et a1, 1980a) have been completed, significant changes in 
the Reference space -1isposal concept have been made (see current summary of 
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Reference Concept, Section 5.2). Because accidents involving the release of 
radioactive material are the only ones of current interest, many previously 
studied accidents/events involving the payload have not been included here. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the possible insults to the currently 
defined Reference nuclear waste payload. The probability of occurrence of the 
events listed was not considered in the construction of this table. This list 
of possible insults to the payload was used to define the events that could 
lead to breach of containment during and after launch. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
5.4.2 Mission Phase and Fault Tree Development 
After the list of possible payload insults was developed (see Table 
1) the space disposal mission was di~ided up into mission phases Which allowed 
the treatment of certain types of accidents. This was necessary because the 
character of accidents changed with the time during the mission. The payload 
altitude and velocity, instantaneous impact point location, potential for 
damage by STS explosion, potential reentry velocity, and the potential for 
deep-space events are constantly changing throughout the mission. 
Previous study resul ts (Rice et aI, 1980a) have indicated that an 
on-pad accident involving the catastrophic failure of the launch vehicle 
[Uprated (LRB) Space Shuttle) will not result in a breach of the current 
Reference payload concept. Environments considered include: (1) the on-pad 
fireball, (2) on-pad residual propellant fire, (3) blast overpressure, (4) 
fragment impact, and (5) hard surface impact. Intact aborts (non-, 
catastrophic) have been eliminated from consideration here, as well as Orbiter 
crash landings (total recovery anticipated for this event). Payload impacts 
onto chemical, munitions, or steel plants have also been eliminated because it 
is believed that their probability is very small and that the payload would 
not be insulted by the' chemical or thermal environment, that it would "fly 
through it" and end up below it in the ground. 
The phases and timelines for the disposal mission are listed in Table 
2. The time lines were developed froo data presented in the Boeing report 
(Reinert et aI, 1982). 
The fault tree analysis method was selected as most appropriate for 
use in this study. Application of the technique yields combinations of basic 
events whose occurrences cause the undesired failure events (containment 
breaches). These event combinations can then be evaluated by various 
screening techniques to determine the high-risk scenarios and their 
probability of occurrence. The fault trees allowed the generation of the 
required probability information about all of the individual failures or 
events. A sample fault tree (for Phase 1) is given in Figure~. Data for the 
fault trees are given in detail in Volume II and are not discussed further 
here. 
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TABLE 1. POSSIBLE INSULTS TO THE SPACE DISPOSAL PAYLOAD 
Impact 
On Ground 
• Rock 
• Han-Hade Structures 
• Soils 
• Ice 
• Water 
• Explosion Fragments 
In Space 
• Meteoroids 
• On-Orbit Debris 
• On-Orbit Vehicles 
• Celestial Bodies 
o Other Waste Payloads 
• Explosion Fragments 
• Comet 
Melting 
On Ground 
• Impact Related 
- Insulation (K < Klimit) 
- Certain Soils 
- Certain Minerals 
• Volcano 
• Chemical Plant/Storage 
• Tank Farm 
• Processing Furnaces 
• On-Pad Accident/Fire 
In Fli~ht 
• Reentry 
- Intact 
Damaged 
Aged/Degraded 
- Fragmented 
Corrosion 
On Ground 
o Aqueous 
- Fresh Water 
- Ocean Water 
- Severe (Brines, 
H2S, etc.) 
- Reducing 
• Nonaqueous 
- Salt Beds 
• Special 
- Chemical Plant/ 
Storage 
• Soils 
In Space 
• Sputtering/ErosIon 
------------------,-----.--------------._----,---------- ,-------
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TABLE 2. MISSION PHASE AND TlMELltm DEFINITION 
Description 
Ignition to Impact Point Clears Land 
Clear Land Impact to LRB Staging 
LRB Staging to MECO(b) 
MECO to LEO(b) Orbit Attainment 
LEO Orbit Attainment to OTV Ignition 
OTV Ignition to Earth Escape 
Earth Escape to OTV Shutdown 
SOlS Coast Through SOlS Burn 
Timeline, sea) 
0-24 
24-124 
124-518 
518-2,134 
2,134-35,024 
35,024-36,926 
36,926-31,005 
31,005-14,295,101 
Placement 14,295,101-3.15EI3 
(a) Data derived from Boeing study (Reinert et al, 1982). 
(b) MECO is main engine cutoff; LEO is launch-to-Earth orbit. 
5.4.3 Payload Response Analysis 
Various payload response analyses were needed to verify the expected 
response of the nuclear waste payload to certain accident environments." 
Emphasis was placed on areas where it was felt that easy answers could be 
provided and where accidents, should they occur, were expected to play a 
predominant role in the risk estimate for space disposal. 
Response analysis was conducted for the reentry of the payload under 
various possible accident conditions. The Battelle RETAC Code was employed. 
The resulting data were used to estimate releases. 
The DYNA2D computer code was used to ~odel (under very simplified and 
conservative assumptions) the impact of the payload on hard granite. The 
results were reflected in the release risk estimates. 
Various corrosion, leaching, and thermal analyses were also conducted 
and used to support the estimated risk estimates. 
5.4.4 Preliminary "Space" Risk Eatimate9 
Baaed upon the fault tree and payload response analyses, the risk for 
space disposal was estimated. Table 3 provides a su~ary of the probabilities 
and fractional releases for possible accident events for space disposal. The 
basis for the fractional release data is described in the right-hand column of 
the table. 
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF SPACE ACClDEh"T COnSEQUENCE ESTIMATES FOR REFERENCE CONCEPT 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Event 
Long-Term 
Corrosion, Ocean 
Hard Rock Impact 
Impact on Volcano 
SoH Meltdown 
Meteorite/Debris 
Impact 
Long-Term 
Corrosion, Soil 
High Velocity on 
Water 
High Velocity on 
Rock 
Hieh Velocity on 
Soil 
Deep-Space Critical 
Meteoroid Impact 
Long-Term Payload 
Return from Deep 
Space 
Expected Probability 
(750 missions) 
8.2E-6 
8.3E-3 
8.2E-12 
1.IE-l2(a) 
1.lE-8 
3.2E-7 
4.7E-7 
3.6E-7 
1.6E-6 
1.8E-4 
Release to Biosphere 
Total (ocean) 
SE-6 Fraction (atmosphere) 
Total (volcano/lava) 
Zero 
Total (atmosphere) 
Total (wet soil) 
Total (ocean) 
SE-4 Fraction (atmosphere) 
IE-3 Fraction (soil) 
Partial 
Total 
Basis 
After Corrosion and Leaching 
RTG(b) Release Data, 
Remainder Recovered 
External Melt Expected 
Event Physically Impossible 
Burn Up Expected if Reentry 
Occurs 
After Corrosion and Leaching 
After Leaching 
100 x Event 2, Remainder 
Recovered 
200 x Event 2, Remainder 
Recovered 
Long-Term Integration 
Long-Term Integration 
(a) This probability relates to safety limits as defined in General Safety Guidelines, Section 5.1; probability 
associated with meltdown much lower and practically impossible to contemplate. 
(b)'RTG is radioisotope thermal generator. 
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Figures 6 and 7 provide the results of the space risk s tlldy. Con-
siderable uncertainty exists in the data. The accomplishment of a Monte Carlo 
analysis needed to help define uncertainty was beyond the scope of this study. 
l-:owever. based upon mathematically carrying through the high- and I ow-
probability data and estimated uncertainty in source terms, we believe there 
are at least two orders of magnitude on either side of the "expected" space 
risk data. Section 5.5 discusses the integration of this risk with the 
terrestrial disposal risk to form the total system release risk values for 
space disposal. 
5.5 Integrated Risk Benefit/Disbenefit for 
Disposal System Cocpleoented by Space 
Disposal of Nuclear Waste 
This section integrates the results of both the PNL and BCL release 
risk assessments for the total nuclear was te disposal systems considr;red in 
the current year study program. Risk is defined as cumulative curies released 
to the accessible environment (what we refer to as the "biosphere"). The 
terrestrial disposal risk is comprised of the following components: (I) 
expected waste-processing releases to the biosphere, (2) probabilistic waste 
releases to the biosphere via a fault event. and (3) probabilistic waste 
releases to the biosphere due to a drilling scenario. The space disposal risk 
is comprised of probabilistic' releases to the biosphere resulting from 
credible accidents that can occur from the launch pad to the final 
destination. Space accidents includ~: 
• Long-term corrosion in the ocean and in wet soil 
• Hard rock impact 
• Volcano impact 
• Meteoroid/debris impact 
• High-velocity impacts 011 sllil. rock, and water 
o Deep-space meteoroid impacts 
• Deep-space payload return over the long term. 
Based upon the data in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 of Volume 11, we will 
discuss and compare the various cumulative release risk contributions for the 
noncomplemented MGR (no space disposal) and the space-complemented MGR 
systems. The approach for discussing the integrated risk is as folIous. For 
the five scenarios listed below, the risk of the noncomplemented MGR will be 
discussed first. followed by the complenented MGR risk, assuming that an 
"ideal" or "zero" risk disposal system could handle the waste removed from the 
complemented MGR. Then. the total integrated risks (complemented MGR plus 
space risk) for each scenario will be compared to the noncomplemented MGR. 
Potential risk benefits or disbenefits based upon the available data will be 
discussed. 
These five scenarios are considered and discussed: 
(1) The cumulative release risk for the sum of the 15 EPA isotopes 
(see McCallum et aI, 1982) for HLW disposal in space 
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(2) The cumulative release risk for the sum of eight actinides (see . 
McCallum et al, 1982) for HLW disposal in space 
(3) The cumulative release risk of Tc-9~ for HLW disposal in space 
(4) The cumulative releas~ risk of 1-129 for 1-129 disposal in 
space 
(5) The cumulative release risk of Tc-99 for Tc-99 disposal in . 
space. 
The integrated results are depicted in Figures 8 through 12. A 
summary of related findings is presente~ below. 
Based Upon Data Derived in the PNL Study 
(1) The risk to future po~~lations from the mined geologic disposal 
of radioactive waste appears to be extremely small. 
(2) In terms of curies released, the escape of fission products 
during normal reprocessing would be expected to be as large as 
the total amount released (due to a natural fault or human 
intrusion) over the subsequent one million years. 
(3) The release of actinide elece~ts dominates 
radionuclides over the expected period of 
intervention (drilling events) in the MGR. 
the escape of 
possible human 
(4) The release of Tc-99 appears to dominate the escape of radio-
nuclides in MGR seismic events. Actinide releases are expected 
to be small. 
(5) Since some radioactive ~teriaJ would be disposed of in an MGR 
for each of the space disposal options examined, space disposal 
could reduce but not eliminate this element of risk. For some' 
radionuclides, the additional waste processing requIred for 
space options would actually increase the waste-reprocessing" .. 
component of the risk. 
(6) The potential for risk benefit i:; limite"- by the degree of 
separati0n and release in waste processin6 and the inclusion of 
TRU wastes in the MCR. 
(7) Current technology indicates that there is no potential for re-
lease risk benefit for the space disposal of 1-129. Potential 
exists for Tc-99 and the actinides for current ~~ste-processing 
technology. 
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Based Upon BeL Preliminary Space Risk Estimates 
(8) The risk of space disposal appears to be very small. 
(9) Short-term space disposal release risk (space component) is 
dominated by payload reentry, impact on hard rock, and complete 
breakup and reentry due to direct meteoroid/payload or debris/ 
payload collisions. 
(10) Long-term release risk (space component) is dominated by the 
failure to locate reentered payloads in the ocean, intact 
payload return from deep-space after rescue attempts fail, and 
small particle return after deep-space meteoroid collisions. 
(11) Short-term accident events dominate the space risk component, 
but not by much (well within any uncertainty band). 
(12) An uncertainty analysis was not possible under the scope of this 
study; however, t'ne uncertainty for the. space disposal risk is 
believed to be within two orders of magnitude of the expected 
value. 
(13) From examination of the release risk for space disposal (space 
component), it is evident that a few contributors to the risk 
would be very difficult to reduce (e.g., meteoroid impact); 
however. most of the risk contributors can be controlled by 
proper design. 
Based Upon Integrated PNL/BCL Risk Data 
(14) Ignoring probabilities, no single accident event examined in the 
study, for either space disposal or mined geologic disposal. 
would be catastrophic ill terms of an immediate threat to a large 
number of human lives or an extensive impact on the environment. 
(15) Although space disposal appears to offer some potential for 
reduction in risk, it should be recognized that the uncertain-
ties in the risk estimates are large and that the predicted risk 
of mined geologic disposal is extremely small to begin with. 
(16) The results of this study only indicate possible benefits/ 
disbenefits of space disposal. To obtain more realistic and 
meaningful results, pathway models resulting in dose estimates 
are needed. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes three major conclusions that come from this 
preliminary risk assessment of nuclear waste disposal in space: 
(1) Preliminary estimates of space disposal risk are low, even with 
the estimated uncertainty bounds. 
(2) If calculated MGR release risks remain low, as given in the PNL 
Waste Mixes Study (McCallum et aI, 1982), and the EPA require-
ments continue to be met, then no additional space disposal 
study effort is warranted. 
(3) If risks perceived by the public are significant in the 
acceptance of mined geologic repositories, then consideration of 
space disposal as an MGR complement is warranted. 
7.0 RECOHMENDATIONS 
As a result of this study, the following recommendations are made to 
NASA and the U.S. DOE: 
(1) During the continued evaluation of the mined geologic repository 
risk over the years ahead by DOE, if any significant increase in 
the calculated health risk is predicted for the MGR, then space 
disposal should be reevaluated at that time. 
(2) The risks perceived by the public for the MGR should be 
evaluated on a broad basis by an independent organization to 
evaluate acceptance. 
(3) If, in the future, MGR risks are found to be significant due to 
some presently unknown technical or social factor, and space 
disposal is selected as an alternative that may be useful in 
mitigating the risks, then the following space disposal study 
activities are recommended: 
• Improvement 1n chemical processing technology for wastes 
• Payload accident response analysis 
• Risk uncertainty analysis for both MGR and space disposal 
• Health risk modeling that includes pathway and dose estimates .' 
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• Space disposal cost modeling 
• Assessment of space disposal perceived .< by public) risk 
benefit 
• Space systems analysis supporting risk and cost modeling. 
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APPENDIX B 
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AC - actinide elements 
ALARA - as low as reasonably achievable 
A.U. 
- astronomical unit 
BCL Battelle Columbus Laboratories 
COR contracting officer's representative 
DOE U.S. Department of Energy 
EPA 
-
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
HLW 
- high-level waste 
JSC - NASA's Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 
KSC 
-
NASA's Kennedy Space Center, Florida 
LEO low Earth orbit 
LRB 
-
Liquid Rocket Booster 
MECO Main Engine cutoff 
MGR 
-
mined geologic repository 
MSFC 
-
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center 
MTHM - metric tons of heavy metal 
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NPPF - Nuclear Payload Preparation Facility 
NRC - U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NWTS - DOE's National ~aste Terminal Storage Program 
ONWI - Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (DOE's) 
ORNL - Oak Ridge National Laboratories 
OTV Orbit Transfer Vehicle 
PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratories 
SAl Science Applications, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois 
SDV - Shuttle Derived Vehicle 
5015 Solar Orbit Insertion Stage 
SRB Solid Rocket Booster 
SSME - Space Shuttle Main Engine 
STS S?ace Transportation System 
TRU transuranic waste 
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